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Abstract—This paper investigates on the problem of
combining routing scheme and physical layer security in
multihop wireless networks with cooperative diversity. We
propose an ad-hoc natured hop-by-hop best secure relay
selection in a multihop network with several relays and an
eavesdropper at each hop which provides a safe routing scheme
to transmit confidential message from transmitter to legitimate
receiver. The selection is based on the instantaneous channel
conditions of relay and eavesdropper at each hop. A theoretical
analysis is performed to derive new closed form expressions for
probability of non-zero secrecy capacity along with the exact
end to end secrecy outage probability at a normalized secrecy
rate. Furthermore, we provide the asymptotic expression to
gain insights on the diversity gain.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless multihop communication between two end nodes
through a series of intermediate relay nodes have been
extensively studied in last few decades. Under the right
circumstances, it helps to extend coverage due to multihop
forwarding, enhances throughput due to shorter hops, extends
battery life due to lower power duration and overcomes
adverse effects of channel fading. As such, it is commonly
implemented in Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETS),
wireless sensor networks (WSNs) and hybrid cellular
networks [? ]. Unfortunately, routing complexity and security
threats increases simultaneously with the number of hops.
A variety of routing protocols have been proposed based
on point to point error free links for wireless multihop links
[? ]. However, these protocols were not designed considering
random behavior and broadcasting nature of wireless
medium in mind. To surmount this limitation, [? ? ]
investigated channel aware routing strategies and considered
routing outage probability as metric for performance
evaluation. In particular, [? ] provided routing strategy for
multihop network with multiple relays at each hop which
allows to achieve diversity gain provided by cooperation
among the relays.
On a different front, there is an increasing consensus in
the research community about securing wireless networks
with physical layer (PHY) security based on
information-theoretic constraint. Traditional cryptographic
approaches are based on intractability of certain
mathematical functions resulting conditional security. In
contrast to cryptographic approaches, PHY security is a
different paradigm where information theoretic perfect
secrecy is achieved by exploiting the uncertain properties of
the wireless channels such as thermal noise, interference, and
the time-varying nature of fading channels. The perfect
secrecy implies that for all secret message X and
eavesdroppers observation of secret message Y ,
Pr(X |Y ) = Pr(X). Seminal work in [? ] showed that
secret message can be transmitted at a positive rate when
eavesdropper has degraded wiretap channel. The existence of
perfect secrecy even when the wiretap channel has better
average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) than the main channel
was shown in [? ] under fading channels.
Several diversity techniques are often exploited to improve
PHY security such as multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
[? ? ], multiuser diversity [? ? ], and cooperative diversity [? ?
]. Most of these works consist of a small network comprising
a single transmitter along with single or multiple legitimate
receivers and eavesdroppers, and possibly cooperating relay
nodes resulting two hop relaying system. Few works have been
done on multihop network with information theoretic secure
constraint using game theory [? ] and stochastic geometry [?
? ]. A PHY security enabled multi-hop system is proposed in
[? ] assisted by single decode and forward (DF) relay in each
hop.
In this paper, we focus on the problem of combining
routing scheme and PHY security in multihop wireless
networks with cooperative diversity. We consider a model
consisting of single transmitter and receiver connected
through series of intermediate clusters each consisting of an
eavesdropper and multiple DF relays. We propose a
hop-by-hop best secure relay selection from each cluster to
achieve full diversity. Selection can be interpreted as a
version of ad-hoc routing scheme based on instantaneous
channel conditions of receiver and eavesdropper at each hop.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we first present the system model for the proposed ad-hoc
routing scheme considering generalized linear network and
obtain the distribution of end to end SNR. The performance
evaluation of the proposed scheme is investigated in terms of
probability of non-zero secrecy capacity and secrecy outage
probability in section IV. Numerical results are provided in
Section V. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
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Fig. 1. Linear network model with K hops and N relays in each hop.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a generalized K-hop linear network model
composed of a source terminal referred as Alice (A) , a
legitimate receiving terminal referred as Bob (B) and K − 1
relay clusters. Each relay cluster comprises N number of DF
relay nodes. In each hop, there exists an eavesdropper
referred as Eve (E) resulting K number of eavesdroppers
(E1, E2, ..., EK) in the entire system model. Alice and Bob
lacks the direct link and communication is performed with
the help of a trusted relay from each cluster. The linear
network model as shown in fig. 1 is quite common in
wireless communications involving as sensor and vehicular
networks.
At each hop, the best secure relay is selected to forward
confidential message. The selected intermediate relay
digitally decodes and re-encodes the received signal from the
immediately preceding relay before retransmission over a
wireless fading channel which we hereafter refer as a main
channel. Meanwhile, the eavesdropper attempts to decode the
message over wiretap channel at each hop. For simplicity,
we assume that the eavesdroppers do not collude and try to
decode the message independently. All the nodes are
assumed to be equipped with a single antenna. Also, we
assume that the distance between each clusters is much
larger than the distance between the relay nodes in any one
cluster. Therefore, the channel gains of the hops are
independently and identically distributed. We further assume
that a transmitter has full channel state information (CSI) of
both the corresponding main channel and wiretap channels
which is a widely adopted assumption in the literature for
communication systems under secrecy constraints [? ].
Let us denote γ
M
(k)
r1,r2
as the instantaneous SNR for main
channel from relay r1 to relay r2 at hop k where,
r1, r2 = 1, 2, ..., N and k = 1, 2, ...,K . Then, the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of instantaneous SNR for hop k
of main channel can be expressed as
Fγ
M
(k)
r1,r2
(x) = 1− e
−
x
γ¯
(k)
M , (1)
where γ¯(k)M represent the average SNR for all links at hop k. In
the first hop, there is only one transmitter (i.e. Alice) resulting
r1 = A for k = 1. Simlarly, in the last hop, there is only one
receiver (i.e. Bob) resulting r2 = B for k = K .
On the other hand, each eavesdropper receives the same
confidential message in two phases except the last one. We
consider E1, E2, ..., EK−1 apply maximal ratio combining
(MRC) to decode the confidential message received in two
phases. We denote γ
W
(k)
r1,Ei
as the instantaneous SNR for
wiretap channel from relay r1 to Eve (Ei) at hop k where,
r1 = 1, 2, ..., N and k, i = 1, 2, ...,K − 1. Then, the
probability density function (PDF) of instantaneous SNR for
hop k of wiretap channel can be [? ] expressed as
f
γ
(k)
W,r1,Ei
(y) =
y(
γ¯
(k)
W
)2 e−
y
γ¯
(k)
W , (2)
where γ¯(k)W represent the average SNR at hop k for Ek. In this
case also, there is only one transmitter (i.e. Alice) at the first
hop resulting r1 = A for k = 1.
The PDF of instantaneous SNR for the last hop at EK is
given by
f
γ
(K)
W,r1,EK
(y) =
1
γ¯
(K)
W
e
−
y
γ¯
(K)
W , (3)
where γ¯(K)W represent the average SNR at hop K for EK .
The secrecy capacity at hop k is given by [? ]
C
(k)
S,r1,r2 =


log
(
1+γ
(k)
M,r1,r2
1+γ
(k)
W,r1,E
)
if γ(k)M,r1,r2 > γ
(k)
W,r1,E
0 otherwise.
(4)
We assume logarithm on a base 2 scale unless stated. To
facilitate the analysis, we define a term secrecy SNR as
γ
(k)
S,r1,r2 =
1 + γ
(k)
M,r1,r2
1 + γ
(k)
W,r1,E
. (5)
From (1), (2), (3) and (5), the CDF of secrecy SNR at hop
k can be obtained as
F
γ
(k)
S,r1,r2
(x) =
∫
∞
0
f
γ
(k)
W,r1,E
(y)F
γ
(k)
M,r1,r2
(x(1 + y)− 1)dy
= 1− e
−
x−1
γ¯
(k)
M
(
γ¯
(k)
M
xγ¯
(k)
W + γ¯
(k)
M
)m
,
(6)
where m = 2 for k = 1, 2, ..K − 1 and m = 1 for k = K .
III. SECURE MULTIHOP ROUTING
A. Proposed Scheme
Our proposed routing scheme is ad-hoc in nature and
performs opportunistic selection of relay with maximum
secrecy SNR, γ(k)S,r1,r2 at each hop. We can know from
intuition that opportunistic selection at each hop can provide
a diversity gain of N . However, there is only one receiver at
the last hop K . Same relay selection technique at the last
hop will not provide any diversity gain. As such, we perform
a joint relay selection based on the secrecy SNR in the last
two hops to acheive full diversity in the last hop as well.
At hop k = 1, ...,K − 2, the best secure relay selected is
given by r∗k−1 = max
r=1,...,N
{
γ
(k)
S,r∗
k−1
,r
}
where r∗k−1 is the relay
chosen at hop k − 1. At hop K − 1, instead of selecting the
path with the largest γ(K−1)S,r∗
K−2
,r, a joint selection is performed
as r∗K−1 = max
r=1,...,N
min
(
γ
(K−1)
S,r∗
K−2
,r, γ
(K)
S,r,r∗
K
)
. It is obvious
that r∗0 = A and r∗K = B. The routing scheme is summarized
in Algorithm 1.
As pointed out in [? ], although the optimal scheme would
be the one which identifies the path with minimum end-to-end
outage probability among all possible paths, it requires high
complexity level and significant amount of feedback as CSI
of all links are required along with joint optimization of all
paths. The ad-hoc nature of the proposed scheme drastically
reduces the feedback and complexity.
The proposed scheme can be implemented in a distributed
fashion as explained in [? ]. The relay sets timer which is
inversely proportional to measured channel gain. As such timer
of the relay with the highest SNR will expire first and send a
flag signal. All other relays after listening the flag signal will
back off.
Algorithm 1 Proposed Secure Routing Scheme
Set K and N
Define r∗k as the index of selected relay node at k-th hop,
k = 1, ...,K − 1
Initialization r∗0 = A and r∗K = B
for k = 1 : K − 2 do
r∗k = max
r=1,...,N
{γ
(k)
S,r∗
k−1
,r}
end for
r∗K−1 = max
r=1,...,N
min{γ
(K−1)
S,r∗
K−2
,r, γ
(K)
S,r,B}
Result best relay {r∗k}
B. End to End SNR Distribution
We need to obtain the distribution of end to end secrecy
SNR at Bob for performance evaluation. Since we assume
DF relays, the instantaneous end to end secrecy rate depends
on minimum of secrecy SNR between K hops which acts as
bottleneck. Therefore, the end to end secrecy SNR at Bob can
be obtained as
γe2e = min
k=1,..,K
γ
(k)
S , (7)
where γ(k)S is denoted as γ
(k)
S1
for k = 1, ...,K − 2 and γ(k)
S2
for k = K − 1. As such, it can be expressed as below
γ
(k)
S1
= max
r=1,...,N
(
γ
(k)
S,r∗
k−1
,r
)
, (8)
γ
(k)
S2
= max
r=1,...,N
min
(
γ
(K−1)
S,r∗
K−2
,r, γ
(K)
S,r,B
)
. (9)
Using order statistics, we can get CDF of γ(k)
S1
from (6) and
(8) as
F
γ
(k)
S1
(x) =

1− e− x−1γ¯(k)M
(
γ¯
(k)
M
xγ¯
(k)
W + γ¯
(k)
M
)2
N
. (10)
For hop K − 1, the relay selection is dependent on the next
Kth hop as well. Hence, the CDF for γ(k)
S2
can be proceeded
as
F
γ
(k)
S2
(x) = Pr
[
max
r=1,...,N
min{γ
(K−1)
S,r∗
K−2
,r, γ
(K)
S,r,B} < x
]
=
N∏
r=1
Pr
[
γmin(r) < x
]
,
(11)
where γmin(r) = min{γ
(K−1)
S,r∗
K−2
,r, γ
(K)
S,r,B}, r = 1, 2, ..., N . We
know
Pr[γmin(r) > x] =
(
1− F
γ
(K−1)
S,r∗
K−2
,r
(x)
)(
1− F
γ
(K)
S,r,B
(x)
)
.
(12)
From (9), (11) and (12), we get
F
γ
(k)
S2
(x) =
[
1−
(
1− F
γ
(K−1)
M,r∗
K−2
,r
(x)
)(
1− F
γ
(K)
M,r,B
(x)
)]N
.
(13)
After simple mathematical manipulation, we finally get the
CDF of γ(k)
S2
as
F
γ
(k)
S2
(x) =
(
1− e
−(x−1)
(
1
γ¯
(K−1)
M
+ 1
γ¯
(K)
M
)
×
γKM
(xγKW + γ
K
M )
(
γK−1M
xγK−1W + γ
K−1
M
)2)N
.
(14)
From (7), we can obtain the CDF of end to end secrecy
SNR using order statistics as
Fγe2e(x) = 1−
K−1∏
k=1
(
1− F
γ
(k)
S
(x)
)
. (15)
As the distribution of end-to-end secrecy SNR is different in
the last two hops from the first K−2 hops, (15) can rewritten
as
Fγe2e(x) = 1−
K−2∏
k=1
(
1− F
γ
(k)
S1
(x)
)(
1− F
γ
(K−1)
S2
(x)
)
,
(16)
which can be simplified using (10) and (14).
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Probability of Non-zero Secrecy Capacity
The instantaneous end-to-end secrecy capacity is expressed
as
CS =
1
K
log(γe2e). (17)
The factor 1/K accounts for the fact that the entire
transmission takes place in K phases. As the secrecy
capacity exists only when the instantaneous SNR of main
channel is greater than the instantaneous SNR of wiretap
channel, we need to examine probability of existence of
non-zero secrecy capacity. From (17), it can be obtained as
Pr(CS > 0) = Pr(γe2e > 1)
= 1− Fγe2e(1).
(18)
The closed form expression for the probability of non-zero
secrecy capacity can be obtained by combining (10), (14), (16)
and (18) and replacing x by 1 as shown below
Pr(CS > 0) =
K−1∏
k=1
(
1−
N∑
i=0
(
N
i
)
(−1)ia2ik
)
, (19)
where ak is defined as
ak =


γ¯
(k)
M
γ¯
(k)
W
+γ¯
(k)
M
if k < K − 1(
γ¯
(K−1)
M
γ¯
(K−1)
W
+γ¯
(K−1)
M
)(
γ¯
(K)
M
γ¯
(K)
W
+γ¯
(K)
M
) 1
2
if k = K − 1.
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
The outage probability is the probability that the
instantaneous end-to-end transmission rate falls below a
threshold secrecy rate (RS). Hence, the outage probability is
given by
Pout = Pr(CS < RS)
= Fγe2e(2
RSK).
(20)
As such, the closed form expression for outage probability
can be easily obtained from (10), (14), (16) and (20) by
replacing x by 2RSK as
Pout = 1−
K−1∏
k=1

1− N∑
j=0
(
N
j
)
(−1)jΓ2jk e
−
(x−1)j
bk

 , (21)
where
bk =


γ¯
(k)
M if k < K − 1
γ¯
(K)
M
γ¯
(K−1)
M
γ¯
(K)
M
+γ¯
(K−1)
M
if k = K − 1,
Γk =


γ¯
(k)
M
pγ¯
(k)
W
+γ¯
(k)
M
if k < K − 1(
γ¯
(K−1)
M
pγ¯
(K−1)
W
+γ¯
(K−1)
M
)(
γ¯
(K)
M
pγ¯
(K)
W
+γ¯
(K)
M
) 1
2
if k = K − 1,
and p = 2RSK .
Although this closed-form expression enable us to evaluate
the performance of proposed scheme, its complex form do not
allow us to gain valuable insights on how the diversity gain is
affected. Therefore, we intend to perform asymptotic analysis
with high secrecy SNR approximations i.e. γe2e → ∞ in the
sequel.
Theorem 1. The asymptotic outage probability as γe2e →∞
is given by
P aout ≈ (2
KRS − 1)N
×

K−2∑
k=1
(
1
γ¯
(k)
M
)N
+
(
1
γ¯
(K−1)
M
+
1
γ¯
(K)
M
)N . (22)
Proof. The end to end CDF of secrecy SNR can be simplified
as
F aγe2e(x) ≈
K−1∑
k=1
F
γ
(k)
S
(x)
. (23)
The approximation comes from the fact that the products of
F
γ
(k1)
S
×F
γ
(k2)
S
, k1 6= k2, are small compared to the F
γ
(k1)
S
. We
know that γe2e → ∞ when γ¯(k)M >> γ¯
(k)
W . Also, expanding
the exponential term in (10) and (14) and ignoring the higher
order terms, we can rewrite the CDFs as
F
γ
(k)
S1
(x) =
(
x− 1
γ¯
(k)
M
)N
, (24)
F
γ
(k)
S2
(x) =
(
(x − 1)(γ¯
(K−1)
M + γ¯
(K)
M )
γ¯
(K−1)
M γ¯
(K)
M
)N
. (25)
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Fig. 2. Pr(CS > 0) as a function of γ¯M (dB) for various values of K and
N .
From (23), (24) and (25), we finally get
F aγe2e(x) = (x− 1)
N
×

K−2∑
k=1
(
1
γ
(k)
M
)N
+
(
1
γ¯
(K−1)
M
+
1
γ¯
(K)
M
)N .
(26)
Substituting x with 2RsK , we get (23).
For a special case of balanced links where average SNR in
all links of main channel and wiretap channels are equal i.e.
γ¯1M = γ¯
2
M = ... = γ¯
K
M = γ¯M and γ¯1W = γ¯2W = ... = γ¯KW =
γ¯W , the asymptotic outage expression reduces to
P aout = (ψγ¯M )
−∆, (27)
where diversity order is ∆ = N and equivalent array gain is
ϕ =
(
(2KRS − 1)N × (K − 2 + 2N)
)
−
1
∆
.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we examine the performance of secrecy
outage probability through numerical evaluations. A linear
network with balanced links and equally spaced relay
clusters is considered to evaluate the performance.
Equidistant clusters are shown to be optimal configuration in
[? ] in the sense of minimizing the error probability when
uniform power allocation is employed.
Figure 2 shows the probability of non zero secrecy capacity
versus γ¯M for different values of K and N . We plot the figure
for selected values of γ¯W to avoid cluttering the figure and
present the effects of K and N in the performance. This figure
highlights that the probability of positive secrecy increases
with γ¯M while decreases with the increase in value of K . The
performance can be remarkably improved by increasing the
number of relays in each cluster.
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Figure 3 compares the secrecy outage probability versus
γ¯M for selected values of K and γ¯W with N = 2 and Rs =
0.5 bits/s/Hz. We can notice that the secrecy outage
probability increases remarkably when we increase the
number of hops. Similarly, we can also observe that decrease
in γ¯W improves the secrecy outage probability. Interestingly,
we can also note that the improvement in secrecy outage
performance with decrease in γ¯W is smaller compared to
decrease in K . But, it is clear that in both cases, the
diversity gain cannot be improved as shown by parallel lines.
Figure 4 depicts the asymptotic and exact secrecy outage
probability versus γ¯M for various values of N with K = 3,
Rs = 1 bits/s/Hz and γ¯W = −10 dB to ensure γ¯M >> γ¯W .
We can observe that the secrecy outage probability decreases
with increase in N . Moreover, the asymptotic curve merges
with exact curve in the high SNR regime. It is evident that
slope of the lines are changed in fig. 3 implying the diversity
gain is affected by N .
To analyze the outage diversity gain, we investigate slope
calculating − log(Pout) and log(γ¯M ) in the range of 26, 28,
and 30 dB. For N = 2, 3 and 4, we have outage diversity of
1.9672, 2.9467, and 3.927 respectively, in the range of γ¯M =
26 − 28 dB. On the other hand, we get outage diversity of
1.9793, 2.9663 and 3.9538 for N = 2, 3, and 4, respectively,
in the range of γ¯M = 28− 30 dB. It is obvious that diversity
gain rounds off to N with the increment in main channel SNR
and it is independent of of number of hops. The asymptotic
diversity is found to be N in the entire range.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have derived the closed form expression
for probability of non-zero secrecy capacity and the secrecy
outage probability as a performance evaluation parameter to
investigate the proposed adhoc routing scheme for a
cooperative multihop wireless network. We have also
presented the asymptotic diversity for the higher values of
SNR of the main channel. Based on our formulation and
numerical results, we have verified that the proposed routing
scheme can take advantage of spatial diversity offered by
number of relays in each cluster.
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